



VOX POPULI ON THE  
'PEACE  
TRAIL'  
BETWEEN  
**KOSOVO AND SERBIA:**  
*Unveiling Women's Role*

June 2024

Funded by:  **Women's Peace &  
Humanitarian Fund**   
A United Nations & Civil Society Partnership



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***Vox Populi on the 'Peace Trail'  
between Kosovo and Serbia:  
Unveiling Women's Role***

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**This survey is supported by:**



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June 2024

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## Executive Summary

This survey aimed to understand the perceptions and attitudes of citizens (*Vox Populi*) regarding the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia and the role of women in this process. This survey was conducted between 27 May – 03 June 2024. A total of 1108 respondents in our survey (89% Albanians, 9% Serbs and 2% from other ethnic groups) made our sample nationally representative of the Kosovo population.

In this survey, *simple proportional sampling* was used for each municipality based on municipality population size. The questionnaire consisted of open and closed-ended questions. To check the work of interviewers during data collection, about 15% (167 respondents) were re-interviewed. This back-check was done through phone interviews and field visits. As a check, the respondents were asked about 5 questions based on the original interview. The checklist served as a tool for compliance review with the random principles of locality, starting point, house unit, and the respondent's selection principle. Responses from the first and the second interview were compared. In addition to the usual screening process, a logical check of the filled-in questionnaires was carried out. The 95% *error margin* of estimates based on the total sample is approximately +/-3 percentage points. However, confidence intervals for estimates based on subsets of the sample, such as the Serb sample of 100 respondents, will be considerably larger.

In terms of the results, in the subsequent paragraphs, we present the findings on the following matters/issues:

- i) The perception of Kosovo's citizens related to the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia;
- ii) the perception of Kosovo's citizens regarding the most recent Brussels agreement between Kosovo and Serbia (February 2023) and its implementation annex reached in Ohrid (March 2023), and the issue of eventually granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/Community is addressed;

- iii) the perception of Kosovo's citizens regarding the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team and inclusion of other actors, with a specific focus on women actors/peacebuilders;
- iv) the underlying reasons for support or lack of support related to points *i*, *ii*, and *iii* above; and
- v) the factors that inhibit women's participation in the dialogue process.

***The first group of findings*** shows that most of the Kosovo population is unsatisfied with the current dialogue process. Overall, **49%** of all the respondents are unsatisfied with the current dialogue process. Both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs displayed dissatisfaction with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. There is less dissatisfaction among Albanians for the current dialogue process, but a significant number of Albanians (26%) and Serb samples also did not have a view on this question (17%). **46%** of Albanians and **80%** of Serbs either were 'strongly dissatisfied' or 'dissatisfied' with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. The first group of findings also focused on potential reasons for being satisfied or not satisfied with the dialogue process. These are the results of the reasons for being **satisfied** with the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia:

- The current dialogue process at least guarantees peace between Kosovo and Serbia (68% of Albanian versus 67% of the Serbian sample);
- The current dialogue process at least prevents the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo (50% of Albanian versus 67% of the Serbian sample);
- The current dialogue process at least keeps the door open for maintaining strong Serbian influence in some parts of Kosovo (35% of Albanian versus 67% of the Serbian sample);
- The current dialogue process at least allows for economic prosperity in Kosovo (64% of Albanian versus 33% of the Serbian sample);
- The current dialogue process maintains good working relationships with the EU and UN (65% of Albanians versus 33% of the Serbian sample).

Below are the results about the reason for **not being satisfied** with the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia:

- There is no perspective of concrete steps toward European integration (60% of Albanian versus 68% of the Serbian sample);
- It is rather impossible to achieve global recognition of Kosovo under current circumstances (64% of Albanian versus 74% of the Serbian sample);
- The independence of Kosovo will not be recognized from Serbia under current circumstances (74% of Albanian versus 79% of the Serbian sample);
- There cannot be economic prosperity in the next 3-5 years (54% of Albanian versus 73% of the Serbian sample);
- It is not possible to have peaceful relations with Serbia in the current status quo (68% of Albanians versus 51% of the Serbian sample);
- Internal problems between the Serb and Albanian communities cannot be solved under the current circumstances (63% of Albanians versus 91% of the Serbian sample).

Regarding whether the Dialogue should continue under the current format for the next five years, **45%** of the total sample indicated a 'somewhat' or 'very much support'. **44%** of Albanians and **42%** of Serbs responded with a 'somewhat' or 'very much support' for continuing the Dialogue under the current format for the next five years. A significant number among the Albanian sample did not have a view on this issue (24%).

***The second group of findings*** is linked with the perception and preferences of Kosovo's citizens and potential reasons for supporting or lacking support for the most recent ***Brussels agreement between Kosovo and Serbia (February 2023) and its implementation annex reached in Ohrid (March 2023)***.

Thus, **43%** of the total sample was either 'not satisfied' or 'very much not satisfied' with the ***most recent Brussels agreement***. **16%** among Albanians and **6%** among Serbs were 'satisfied' or 'very much satisfied' with the most recent Brussels

agreement between Kosovo and Serbia and its implementation annex reached in Ohrid. However, a significant number of Albanians (43%) and Serbs (33%) have responded that they don't know/don't have a view on this issue.

Then, we specifically focused on the issue of ***granting executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community, provided that, in return, Serbia agreed that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations***. The majority of respondents, **50%**, responded with either '*strongly disagree*' or '*disagree*' with this claim. There is weak support among Kosovo Albanians (**13%**) but significantly more support among Serbs (**46%**) to grant executive powers to the Kosovo Serb association/community provided that, in return, Serbia provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations. A significant number of Albanian (34%) and Serbian respondents (35%) responded with 'don't know/don't have a view' to this question. Below are results about the reason that respondents **agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community**:

- It will improve the economic prosperity in Kosovo in the next 3-5 years (76% of Albanian versus 45% of the Serbian sample);
- It will give Serbs who live in Kosovo more say in the decision-making process (64% of Albanian versus 98% of the Serbian sample);
- It will improve the integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo (69% of Albanian versus 98% of the Serbian sample);
- It will improve relationships with Serbia (53% of Albanians versus 91% of the Serbian sample).

Below are results about the reasons that respondents **do not agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community**:

- It will entrench divisions among communities in Kosovo (65% of Albanian versus 26% of the Serbian sample);
- It will increase the political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia (70% of Albanian versus 79% of the Serbian sample);
- It will open the door for establishing a mini Republica Srpska in Kosovo (72% of Albanian versus 16% of the Serbian sample);



- It will make it harder to achieve economic prosperity for Kosovo in the next 3-5 years (63% of Albanians versus 26% of the Serbian sample).

The *third group of findings* is related to the perception of Kosovo's citizens regarding the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team, specifically focusing on women's representation in the dialogue team. Related to this, the survey posed questions about the (a) representation of the dialogue team only by the highest governmental level (i.e., prime minister and deputy prime minister); (b) whether Kosovo government should make efforts to include other actors (e.g., representatives from opposition political parties, civil society, academia, etc.) and specifically (c) women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue; and (d) whether citizens of Kosovo would support appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia.

Regarding the *first point, which is a representation of the dialogue team only by the highest governmental level (i.e., prime minister and deputy prime minister)* – 46% of the total sample responded with either 'strongly disagree' or 'disagree' about the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team only by highest governmental level representatives. 34% of Albanian and 37% of Serbian respondents responded with either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' about the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team only by the highest governmental level representatives. A significant number among Albanians (20%) and Serbs (18%) responded with 'don't know/don't have a view on this issue.

Regarding the *second point, that is whether the Kosovo government should make efforts to include other actors (e.g., representatives from opposition political parties, civil society, academia, etc.)* – 66% of the total sample responded with 'definitely should' or 'probably should' make efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue meetings in Brussels. 18% of Albanians and 29% of Serbs responded that the Kosovo government 'definitely should not' or 'should not' make efforts to include other representatives. Below are results about the reason that respondents **agree with the Kosovo government making efforts to include other actors:**

- Inclusion of other representatives would make the Dialogue more open and transparent (87% of Albanian versus 95% of the Serbian sample);
- Inclusion of other actors would make the dialogue meetings more effective with respect to reaching agreements (85% of Albanian versus 96% of the Serbian sample);
- Inclusion of other representatives would enhance local ownership regarding agreements (78% of Albanian versus 91% of the Serbian sample);
- Inclusion of other representatives would make the implementation of agreements more realistic (77% of Albanian versus 76% of the Serbian sample).

Below are results about the reasons that respondents **do not agree with the Kosovo government making efforts to include other actors:**

- Inclusion of other representatives in the Dialogue would make it impossible to coordinate the Dialogue (56% of Albanian versus 62% of the Serbian sample);
- Inclusion of other actors would make the dialogue meetings less effective with respect to reaching agreements (54% of Albanian versus 72% of the Serbian sample);
- Only governmental actors should have the responsibility for the dialogue process (65% of Albanian versus 79% of the Serbian sample);
- European Union mediators do not allow space for many actors to participate in the dialogue process (39% of Albanian versus 38% of the Serbian sample).

The ***third point is whether the Kosovo government should make efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue*** – 82% of the total sample responded with 'definitely should' or 'probably should' make efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue. 8% of Albanians and 36% of Serbs responded that the Kosovo government 'definitely should not' or 'should not' make efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue.

Regarding the *fourth point, whether they would support appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia* – 82% of the total sample responded with 'very much' or 'somewhat' in support of appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process. 7% among Albanians and 32% among Serbs responded with 'very little' or 'not at all' about appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process.

**The fourth and final group of the findings** is related to potential obstacles women face in participating in the dialogue process. The samples were exposed to a series of statements about the potential obstacles, and below we present 'strongly agree' or 'agree' responses from the total sample:

- Women are not represented in Dialogue because the main political actors are dominated by men **(63%)**;
- Women are not represented in Dialogue because the government lacks a strategy supporting women's engagement in Dialogue **(61%)**;
- Women lack motivation to engage in the dialogue process **(41%)**;
- The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes **(38%)**;
- International actors are to blame because they do not impose criteria for gender inclusion in the dialogue process **(37%)**;
- It is tough for women to be committed to Dialogue **(28%)**;
- The Dialogue involves tough negotiations that only men can do **(16%)**.

Results showed that there were gender differences in statements (a) ***The Dialogue involves tough negotiations that only men can do*** (this perception is more prevalent among men than women); (b) ***The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes*** (this perception is more prevalent among women than men); and (c) ***International actors are to blame because they do not impose criteria for gender inclusion in the dialogue process*** (this perception is more prevalent among women than men).

In brief, the perspectives of the two communities are similar and different in some respects. Albanian and Serbian respondents were particularly dissatisfied with

the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex between Kosovo and Serbia. Albanian and Serbian respondents also had a clear voice in support of the inclusion of other representatives, especially women actors/peacebuilders in the Kosovo dialogue team. Albanian and Serbian differ pretty fundamentally regarding the extended executive powers of the Kosovo Serb Association/community. Serb respondents showed particular concern about political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia, while the Albanian respondents undeniably worried about the risks of developing a mini Republika Srpska. The responses from our respondents suggest that, in these respects, Dialogue does not need to be a 'zero-sum' game where any gains for one side have to be at the expense of losses for the other side.

## 1. Introduction

The survey, 'Vox Populi on the 'Peace Trail' between Kosovo and Serbia: *Unveiling Women's Role*,' was conducted between 27 May and 03 June 2024. The survey had three broad aims. The *first* aim of the survey was to understand the perceptions and attitudes of the citizens regarding the current dialogue process and the most recent Brussels agreement between Kosovo and Serbia (February 2023) and its implementation annex reached in Ohrid (March 2023). The *second* aim was to understand the perceptions of Kosovo's citizens regarding the representation of Kosovo's dialogue team and the support or lack of it for the inclusion of other actors, with a specific focus on women actors/peacebuilders in the dialogue team. The *third* aim was to understand factors that inhibit women's participation in the dialogue process. It is worth noting that this survey rests on the findings from the previous joint policy report published in April 2024 by RIDEA and Inclusive Peace 'Shaping Peace: Women's Inclusion in the Kosovo-Serbia Peace Process'. The findings from the structured interviews conducted for the previous joint policy report by RIDEA and Inclusive Peace, in a nutshell, highlighted the exclusive nature of the peace process between Kosovo and Serbia, particularly the main challenges for the inclusion of women. Based on this, the survey employed closed-ended questions and sought to understand Kosovo citizens' views on the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia, women's role in this process, and the obstacles women face in being included in the dialogue process.

As a matter of background, Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, a move that Serbia does not recognize. On 9 September 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution Nr. 64/298 by acclamation. This resolution acknowledged the content of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence and welcomed the European Union's (EU) readiness to facilitate a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. The first meeting of the EU-facilitated Dialogue took place on 8 March 2011. Since then, the Dialogue has been conducted at two levels: (i) technical Dialogue and (ii) political Dialogue. Between 2011 and 2022, various agreements were reached, though with some ups and downs, and

several times, the dialogue process has been halted for months. The ongoing normalization talks between the two nations, facilitated by international actors, aim to establish mutual understanding and cooperation while addressing governance, security, and economic development issues. While some progress has been achieved regarding freedom of travel, border management, protection of religious and cultural heritage, and the integration of police, many other agreements have not been implemented or only partially implemented by both countries.<sup>1</sup>

Due to the geopolitical changes following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, France and Germany launched a more urgent initiative in September 2022, presenting a concrete plan to normalize relations between the two states and consequently alleviate tensions in the North of Kosovo, which could generate further tensions between Kosovo and Serbia. This initiative was subsequently recognized as a united EU effort with the support of the United States. New 'shuttle' diplomacy commenced involving envoys from the EU, the US, France, Germany, and Italy travelling to Kosovo and Serbia, with follow-up meetings in Brussels between delegations from Kosovo and Serbia. Finally, in February 2023, spurred by the EU and the US, Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement on the path to normalization. Later, on 18 March 2023, in Ohrid (North Macedonia), Kosovo and Serbia reached the Implementation Annex to the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of Relations between the two countries. However, since then, the implementation of the Agreement and its annex has stalled.

In fact, the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia is not isolated from the broader context of contemporary peace processes. First, peace processes between Kosovo and Serbia are viewed as being in a condition of stalemate, with political stakeholders perceiving them as a platform for unnecessary compromises or a zero-sum game. Others express concerns about weak internal

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<sup>1</sup> European Commission (2013) 'Serbia and Kosovo\*: historic agreement paves the way for decisive progress in their EU perspectives', Press Release, 22 April. Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-13-347\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-347_en.htm) (Accessed on: 11/06/2024).

commitments and the diminishing external leverage of the EU, which has spearheaded dialogue efforts to advance the process and peacebuilding to address stalled negotiations and deficits in implementation<sup>2</sup>.

This brief background and context also informed some of the issues that have been addressed in this poll and are being presented in the subsequent sections of this report.

## **2. Methodology**

### **2.1. Survey Design**

The questionnaire consisted of closed-ended questions with the following structure: demographic data about the participants, their understanding, attitudes and support, or lack of support, for the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia, the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team with a specific focus on women's representation, and obstacles for women's participation in the dialogue process. The questionnaire contained a few open-ended questions for citizens to be able to express alternative views. Two independent researchers rated the questionnaire in terms of comprehensibility and clarity of questions.

### **2.2. Survey Procedure**

The research team comprised 13 field interviewers (including two particular field interviewers for Serb respondents in Kosovo), 3 senior researchers/experts, and two research and admin assistants. Their work resulted in the current research report. Field interviewers administered the questionnaires with tablets using specially designed software for this survey. Field interviewers filled out the questionnaire to ensure no missing data. However, the respondents were free not to respond to the questions. In order to avoid interview bias, the research team trained all field interviewers to conduct the survey.

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<sup>2</sup> RIDEA and Inclusive Peace (2024). 'Shaping Peace: Women's Inclusion in the Kosovo-Serbia Peace Process'. Available at: <https://www.ridea-ks.org/uploads/ShapingPeace.pdf> (Accessed on: 11/06/2024).

In order to check the work of interviewers during data collection, about 15% (a total of 167 respondents) were re-interviewed. This back-check was done chiefly through phone interviews and some field visits. As a check, the respondents were asked about 5 questions based on the original interview. The checklist served as a tool for compliance review with the principle of randomized selection of respondents (covering a selection of locality, starting point, house unit, and respondent selection). Responses from the first and the second interview were compared. In addition to the usual screening process, a logical control of the filled-in questionnaires was carried out.


### 2.3. Sampling

The survey was carried out in 38 Kosovo municipalities of the 7 main regions in Kosovo: Prishtina, Ferizaj, Gjilan, Prizren, Peja, Gjakova and Mitrovica (North and South; see the map below). Kosovo has a population of 1,798,506 inhabitants<sup>3</sup>. In this survey, simple proportional sampling was used for each municipality, based on municipality population size, that is, on the ratio of the number of registered population in a specific municipality to the total number of registered inhabitants in Kosovo. The resulting ratio determines the weight of each municipality in the sample. The baseline of the registered population was derived from the Kosovo Statistical Agency.

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<sup>3</sup> Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2021) "Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2021". Available at: <https://askapi.rks-gov.net/Custom/4bd04f76-1e2b-444c-8dc1-86d3edf20225.pdf> (Accessed on: 05/06/2024).






The questionnaires were administered in respondents' houses and apartments. A random route sampling procedure was used to determine the study sample, with prescribed rules for the choice of starting point and the subsequent selection of street, building, apartment and respondent. The questionnaire was administered to only 1 family member. This was done as such in order to avoid bias in the sample.

In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample of Serbs for useful analysis, the two major predominantly Serbian municipalities, Mitrovica North (in the north of Kosovo) and Graçanica (in the South of Kosovo), were oversampled. This yielded a sample of 100 Serbian respondents instead of the 50 respondents that would have been obtained without oversampling.

## 2.4. Sample Characteristics

The total number of respondents is 1108. With a sample of this size, estimates will have a sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points (at the five percent level of significance). Note, however, that the sampling error will be smaller when estimates are just for the Serb sample of 100 respondents: with a sample of 100, the 95% confidence interval will be approximately plus or minus 1 percentage point. Therefore, all differences between the Serb and Albanian samples have been checked for statistical significance.

As noted above, the study has been conducted across all (seven) Kosovo regions and (thirty-eight) municipalities. See below the sample distribution in the seven regions.



Since the number of interviews for each municipality was based on the proportion of the population in each municipality, the distribution of the achieved sample thus corresponds closely to the distribution of the population. See below the table depicting the population size based on the Kosovo Agency of Statistics<sup>4</sup> and the number of interviews per municipality.

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
<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

**VOX POPULI ON THE 'PEACE TRAIL' BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA: UNVEILING  
WOMEN'S ROLE**

Table 1. Population size and the number of interviews per municipality			
No	Municipality	Population	No. of Interviews
1	<i>Ferizaj</i>	<i>103,003</i>	<i>63</i>
2	<i>Shtime</i>	<i>27,654</i>	<i>35</i>
3	<i>Kaçanik</i>	<i>33,409</i>	<i>20</i>
4	<i>Shtërpcë</i>	<i>6,773</i>	<i>8</i>
5	<i>Hani i Elezit</i>	<i>9,998</i>	<i>6</i>
6	<i>Gjakovë</i>	<i>95,340</i>	<i>58</i>
7	<i>Rahovec</i>	<i>59,102</i>	<i>36</i>
8	<i>Deçan</i>	<i>41,808</i>	<i>26</i>
9	<i>Junik</i>	<i>6,370</i>	<i>4</i>
10	<i>Gjilan</i>	<i>80,162</i>	<i>48</i>
11	<i>Kamenica</i>	<i>30,750</i>	<i>19</i>
12	<i>Viti</i>	<i>47,615</i>	<i>29</i>
13	<i>Ranillug</i>	<i>3,810</i>	<i>3</i>
14	<i>Novobërdë</i>	<i>7,160</i>	<i>5</i>
15	<i>Partesh</i>	<i>1730</i>	<i>2</i>
16	<i>Klllokot</i>	<i>2,753</i>	<i>2</i>
17	<i>Mitrovicë</i>	<i>69,346</i>	<i>44</i>
18	<i>Vushtrri</i>	<i>64,468</i>	<i>39</i>
19	<i>Mitrovica Veriore</i>	<i>12,211</i>	<i>40</i>
20	<i>Zveçan</i>	<i>7,376</i>	<i>5</i>
21	<i>Zubin Potok</i>	<i>6,616</i>	<i>5</i>
22	<i>Leposaviq</i>	<i>13,587</i>	<i>8</i>
23	<i>Skenderaj</i>	<i>52,343</i>	<i>32</i>
24	<i>Pejë</i>	<i>99,568</i>	<i>61</i>
25	<i>Istog</i>	<i>40,380</i>	<i>11</i>
26	<i>Klin</i>	<i>40,122</i>	<i>12</i>
27	<i>Prishtinë</i>	<i>211,755</i>	<i>131</i>
28	<i>Obiliq</i>	<i>19,144</i>	<i>12</i>
29	<i>Fushë Kosovë</i>	<i>38,607</i>	<i>24</i>
30	<i>Lipjan</i>	<i>57,733</i>	<i>35</i>
31	<i>Podujevë</i>	<i>83,445</i>	<i>51</i>
32	<i>Glllogoc</i>	<i>61,133</i>	<i>19</i>
33	<i>Graçanicë</i>	<i>12,091</i>	<i>20</i>
34	<i>Prizren</i>	<i>191,565</i>	<i>112</i>
35	<i>Suharekë</i>	<i>60,247</i>	<i>21</i>
36	<i>Malishevë</i>	<i>58,269</i>	<i>37</i>
37	<i>Mamushë</i>	<i>5,950</i>	<i>4</i>
38	<i>Dragash</i>	<i>34,316</i>	<i>21</i>
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,798,506</b>	<b>1108</b>

89% of the study sample were Albanians, 9% Serbs, and 2% were from other ethnic groups in Kosovo. The Albanian percentage of the sample closely corresponds to that recorded in the 2011 census, which shows that 91% were Albanian, 3.4% Serb and 5.6% 'Other'. As mentioned in Section 2.3 and as the percentages demonstrate, the Serb population were oversampled to provide a sufficient number of respondents for comprehensive analysis. The small number of 'other' ethnic groups is too small for proper analysis and does not provide a reliable basis for weighting.

43.2% of the sample is male and 56.8% is female. The mean age of the sample is 43 years old, and the age range is 18-93 years old. Below is the distribution of the sample by age group.



Compared with census figures from 2011, women and younger people are somewhat over-represented in the achieved sample. Moreover, neither age nor education are strongly related to the distribution of this report's variables. We have, therefore, simply reported the unweighted percentages.

Regarding education level, 2% of the sample reported having no school degree, 3% reported elementary education only (1-5 classes), 15% reported lower

secondary education (6-9 classes), 31% upper secondary school (gymnasium or vocational), 3% the post-secondary vocational education, 31% reported university (Bachelor) degree, 5% mainly with Master, and few with PhDs. As is usual with surveys, there is some over-representation of those with higher education.

Regarding the employment level of our sample, 52% reported to have been employed at the time of the interview, 23% were unemployed, 7% were students, 10% were retired, 6% were fulfilling domestic tasks, and 2% were unspecified. Concerning employment categories, 31% reported to have been professional or in technical occupations (e.g., doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, accountant, etc.), 3% higher administrator occupations (e.g., banker, executive in big business, government official, etc.), 4% clerical occupations (e.g., secretary, office manager, bookkeeper, etc.), 5% sales occupations (e.g., sales manager, shop owner, etc.), 5% service occupations (e.g., restaurant owner, police officer, caretaker, etc.), 6% skilled worker (e.g., motor mechanic, electrician, etc.), 2% semi-skilled worker (e.g., bus driver, carpenter, etc.), 1% unskilled worker (e.g., labourer, porter, etc.), 1% farm worker (e.g., farmer, farm labourer, etc.), 7% students, 19% housewives, and 16% unspecified.

## 2.5. Data analysis

Participants' responses were entered in SPSS. Descriptive statistics, such as frequencies and cross-tabulations by ethnic groups, were used to analyze the data. We have also checked whether results varied by age, gender, and educational level.

## 3. Findings


This section outlines the findings of this survey under four sub-sections: **(i)** the perception of Kosovo's citizens related to the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia (including the underlying reasons for supporting or not the dialogue process) and their support of the dialogue process under the current

format; **(ii)** the perception of Kosovo's citizens regarding the most recent Brussels agreement between Kosovo and Serbia (February 2023) and its implementation annex reached in Ohrid (March 2023), including the underlying reasons for support or lack of support); **(iii)** the perception of Kosovo's citizens regarding the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team with a specific focus on women's representation in the team (including the underlying reasons for support or lack of support); and **(iv)** factors that inhibit women's participation in the dialogue process.


### 3.1. Kosovo's citizens' perception regarding the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia

The following question was asked about this issue: **How satisfied are you with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia?**


The findings concerning this issue produced the following landscape: Almost half of the sample, 49%, were not satisfied with the current dialogue process (17% said that they are 'strongly dissatisfied' and 32% said 'dissatisfied'). About 26% responded that they (3% saying 'strongly satisfied' and 23% 'satisfied') are satisfied with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. 25% of participants do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue. There is, therefore, an evident dissatisfaction among Kosovo citizens with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia.



Assessment of responses for the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a somewhat different pattern of responses: 46% among Albanians and 80% among Serbs either were 'strongly dissatisfied' or 'dissatisfied' with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. 28% among Albanians and 3% among Serbs were either 'strongly satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the current dialogue process. 26% among Albanians and 17% among Serbs 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue. These differences are statistically different (at least at 0.05 level) but are generally in line with the idea of not being satisfied with the current dialogue process.



Then, we proceeded with a number of follow-up questions about the underlying reasons why respondents were or were not satisfied with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. Respondents who responded with either 'strongly satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia responded in the following way (see the graph below) regarding the underlying reasons why they were satisfied with the current status quo (as noted above, only 29% of the Albanian and 3% of the Serb samples were satisfied and hence were exposed to these particular follow-up questions, so the responses are based on a very small number of respondents, especially in the Serb sample):




As can be seen, Albanian respondents were most likely to cite that the current dialogue process at least guarantees peace between Kosovo and Serbia, followed by good working relationships with the EU and UN. Serbian respondents were most likely, but equally, to cite that the current dialogue process at least guarantees peace, prevents the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo and keeps the door open for maintaining strong Serbian influence in Kosovo. At the point when respondents were asked to rate the reasons mentioned above as the most important for being satisfied with the Dialogue, Albanian (46%) and Serbian



samples (67%) most frequently considered the dialogue process at least guarantees peace.


We turn next to the respondents who were either 'strongly dissatisfied' or 'not satisfied' with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. A differently worded set was asked of these respondents, and a parallel of follow-up questions was posed. Almost half of Albanians (46%) and the majority of Serb (80%) samples were exposed to this series of questions:




As can be seen, the Albanian respondents were most likely to cite the lack of recognition by Serbia, followed by the lack of peaceful relations with Serbia or achieving global recognition under current circumstances. Serbian respondents, however, were most likely to cite that internal problems cannot be solved under the current circumstances, followed by a considerable margin with the lack of recognition from Serbia (all other responses closely followed). When respondents were asked to rate the reasons mentioned above as the most important for not being satisfied with the Dialogue, Albanian respondents most often cited a lack of recognition by Serbia (22.1%). In contrast, Serbian respondents most frequently cited the internal problems between the Serb and Albanian communities (46%).

Related to the perception of the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia, the following question was posed: **Would you support continuing the Dialogue under the current format for the next five years?**

32.4% of the total sample indicated 'not at all' or 'very little' support for continuing the Dialogue under the current format for the next five years. 44.6% indicated a 'somewhat' or 'very much support' for continuing the Dialogue under the current format. 23% responded with don't know/don't really have a view on this issue.



Evaluation of responses of Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a somewhat similar pattern of responses. 32% of Albanians and 44% of the Serbian respondents indicated 'not at all' or 'very little' support for continuing the Dialogue under the current format for the next five years. 44% among Albanians and 42% among Serbs indicated a 'somewhat' or 'very much support' for continuing the Dialogue under the current format (see the graph below). 24% and 14% among Albanians and Serbs, respectively, responded with don't know/don't really have a view on this issue.



### 3.2. Perception of Kosovo's citizens regarding the agreements between Kosovo and Serbia


Regarding the agreements, the survey focused on the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex between Kosovo and Serbia. Similarly, within this section, the survey looked upon the issue of granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community, provided that, in return, Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations.

#### 3.2.1. Support for the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex


Turning to the question regarding the agreements between Kosovo and Serbia, we posed the following question: **How satisfied are you with the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex between Kosovo and Serbia under the EU facilitation?**<sup>5</sup> 14.9% of the total respondents were either 'very much satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex between Kosovo and Serbia under the EU

<sup>5</sup> Participants were also provided with additional explanation related to this question: Some of the critical points of the agreement include: mutually recognizing their respective documents and national symbols, establishing association/community of Serb majority municipalities, formalizing the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, and eventual accession of Kosovo in international organizations.

facilitation. Most respondents (43.3%) were either 'not satisfied' or 'very much not satisfied' with the most recent Brussels agreement. A significant number of participants (41.8%) responded with 'don't know/don't really have a view' on this issue.




Evaluation of responses separately for Albanian and Serbian respondents indicates a somewhat similar pattern. 16% among Albanian and 6% among Serbian respondents were either 'very much satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex between Kosovo and Serbia. 43% among Albanian and 61% among Serbian respondents were either 'not satisfied' or 'very much not satisfied' with the most recent Brussels agreement. 43% and 33% of Albanian and Serbian respondents, respectively, responded with 'don't know/don't really have a view' on this issue. These results show that Serbian respondents have a more uniform perception of the most recent Agreement than Albanian respondents.




### 3.2.2. Support for the extended executive powers of the Kosovo Serb Association/Community

In examining Kosovo citizens' perceptions regarding the most recent Brussels agreement, the survey also focused on the issue of granting extended executive powers to the Association/Community of Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. The following question was posed in the survey: **Do you agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/Community, provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations?**<sup>6</sup> 15.7% of the total sample either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' about granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations. However, half of the participants (50.1%) either 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree' about granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community, provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations. 34.2% responded with 'don't know/don't have a view' about this issue.


<sup>6</sup> To further clarify this question, we provided the following explanation: With extended executive powers, we mean powers that include constitutional change and would create a new political entity in Kosovo, a semi-autonomous entity.



Analysis of responses among Albanian and Serbian samples reveals contrasting patterns of responses regarding extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community, provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations. 13% among Albanians compared to 46% among Serbs either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' about granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community, provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations. 53% among Albanians, compared to 19% among Serbs, either 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree' about granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community, provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations. 34% among Albanians and 35% among Serbs' do not know/do not have a view' on this issue. These results indicate the difference in support regarding the Kosovo Serb Association/Community between Albanians and Serbs.




With a number of follow-up questions, the survey sought to understand the underlying reasons why respondents did or did not agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community, provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations. Respondents who responded with either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community were asked the following questions (13% of the Albanian and 46% of the Serbian samples were exposed to these questions):



Among the Albanian respondents who were asked these particular follow-up questions, the reason most often given was about economic prosperity in Kosovo, followed by improving the integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo and the fact that Serbs would have more say in the decision-making process. Among Serbian respondents, the reason most often given was the integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo and that Serbs will have more say in the decision-making process, followed closely by improving the relationship with Serbia. These reasons, among Serbs, outscored by a considerable margin the alternative reason to do with economic prosperity in Kosovo. When respondents were asked to rate the reasons mentioned above as the most important for granting extended executive powers, Albanian respondents most often cited economic prosperity (55%), whereas Serbian respondents most frequently cited that it would give Serbs more say in the decision-making process (70%).

Turning next to those respondents who responded with 'strongly disagree' or 'disagree' with granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community, a different series of follow-up questions were posed (53% Albanian and 19% Serbian sample were exposed to these questions):



As can be seen, the Albanian respondents who were opposed to granting executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association agreed that such powers might open the



door for establishing a mini Republica Srpska, followed closely by concerns over increased political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia and entrenched divisions among communities in Kosovo. Among the Serbian respondents, the most often cited reason was that such power might increase political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia, followed by a considerable margin that it might entrench divisions among communities in Kosovo and it will make more complex economic prosperity in Kosovo. When respondents were asked to rate the reasons mentioned above as the most important for granting extended executive powers, Albanian respondents most often cited that it might open the door for establishing a mini Republica Srpska (40%), whereas Serbian respondents most frequently cited that it will make harder for Kosovo to achieve economic prosperity (53%).


### 3.3. Support for the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team

To address this, participants were exposed to the following options/alternatives regarding the representation of the team: a) to what extent they support the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team only by the highest governmental representatives; b) should the Kosovo government make efforts to include other representatives such as opposition political parties, civil society, academia, etc. (including underlying reasons for inclusion or not inclusion of other representatives); and c) whether Kosovo government should make efforts to include women representatives in the team. Related to the last point, we also explored the factors inhibiting women's participation in the Dialogue and to what extent they support a woman in leading the dialogue team.


#### 3.3.1. Should the Kosovo dialogue team be represented only by the highest governmental representatives?

Regarding this, respondents were asked the following question: **Currently, the dialogue meetings in Brussels between Kosovo and Serbia facilitated by the EU are represented only by governmental representatives from the highest level (i.e., prime minister and deputy prime minister). Do you agree that the Kosovo team should be represented only by representatives from the highest governmental level?** 34% of the total sample

responded with either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' about representing the Kosovo dialogue team only by the highest governmental level representatives (see the chart below). Nonetheless, almost half of the participants (46%) responded with either 'strongly disagree' or 'disagree' about the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team only by the highest governmental level representatives. 20% responded with 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue.




Separate analysis of Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a similar pattern of responses. 37% among Albanian and Serbian samples either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team only by the highest governmental level representatives. 36% among Albanians, compared with 45% among Serbs, are either 'dissatisfied' or 'strongly dissatisfied' with the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team only by the highest governmental level representatives (see the graph below). 20% among Albanians and 18% among Serbs responded with 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue. These results indicate that Albanian citizens in Kosovo are almost equally divided as to whether the Kosovo dialogue team should be represented only by the highest governmental representatives compared to the Serbian citizens in Kosovo, who are generally more dissatisfied with the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team only by highest government representatives.




### 3.3.2. Should the Kosovo Government make efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue team?


Regarding this, respondents were asked the following question: **Do you think that the Kosovo government should make efforts to include other representatives (e.g., representatives from opposition political parties, civil society, academia, etc.) in the dialogue meetings in Brussels?** 66% of the sample responded with 'definitely should' or 'probably should', making efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue meetings in Brussels. 19% responded with 'definitely should not' or 'should not', making efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue meetings in Brussels. 15% 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue.



A separate analysis of Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a similar response trend. 67% among the Albanian respondents and 55% among the Serbian respondents think that the Kosovo government 'definitely should' or 'probably should' make efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue meetings in Brussels. 18% among the Albanian respondents and 29% among the Serbian respondents think that the Kosovo government 'definitely should not' or 'should not' make efforts to include other representatives in dialogue meetings in Brussels (see the graph below). 15% among Albanians and 16% among Serbs responded with 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue.




With several follow-up questions, the survey sought to understand the underlying reasons why respondents should or should not make efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue meetings in Brussels. Respondents who responded with Kosovo 'definitely should' or 'probably should' make efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue meetings in Brussels were asked the following questions (67% of the Albanian and 55% of the Serbian samples were exposed to these questions):



Among the Albanian respondents who were asked these follow-up questions, the reason most often given for including other representatives was that it would be more open, transparent, and more effective in reaching agreements. Serbian respondents cited all three reasons almost equally frequently, with the exception that the inclusion of other representatives would make the implementation of agreements more realistic. When respondents were asked to rate the reasons mentioned above as the most important for including other representatives, Albanian respondents most often cited dialogue openness and transparency (45%), whereas Serbian respondents most frequently cited local ownership reasons (35%).

Turning next to those respondents who responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should not' or 'should not' make efforts to include other representatives in the dialogue meetings in Brussels (18% of the Albanian and 29% of the Serbian samples were exposed to these questions):




As can be seen, the Albanian respondents who did not support the inclusion of other representatives most often cited the reason that only the governmental actors should have the responsibility for the Dialogue, followed by the reason that including other representatives would make the Dialogue impossible to coordinate effectively. Serbian respondents most often cited the reason that only the governmental actors should have the responsibility for the Dialogue, followed closely by the reason that including other representatives would make the Dialogue less effective regarding agreements. When respondents were asked to rate the reasons mentioned above as the most important for not including other representatives, both Albanian (30%) and Serbian respondents (38%) most often cited the governmental responsibility for the dialogue process.


### 3.4. The representation of women in the Kosovo dialogue team

Regarding this issue, respondents were asked the following question: Currently, women actors/peacebuilders are underrepresented (there are no women in key/leading positions) in the Kosovo dialogue team mediated by the EU in Brussels. **Do you think the Kosovo government should make more efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue?** 82.4% of the total sample responded that the Kosovo government 'definitely should' or 'probably should' make more efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue. In contrast, only 10.7% responded that the Kosovo government

'definitely should not' or 'should not' make more efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue. 6.9% responded with 'don't know/don't have a view' on this issue.



Separate analysis of Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a similar pattern of responses. 86% among Albanians and 53% among Serbs responded that the Kosovo government 'definitely should' or 'probably should' make more efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the dialogue. 8% among Albanians and 36% among Serbs responded that the Kosovo government 'definitely should not' or 'should not' make more efforts to include women actors/peacebuilders in the dialogue. 7% among Albanians and 11% among Serbs 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue. These results indicate that among Albanian respondents, there is strong support for the inclusion of women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue. Differently, Serbian respondents in Kosovo seem more heterogeneous, albeit with the majority supporting including women actors/peacebuilders in the Dialogue.




Related to this, participants were also exposed to the following question: **Would you support the appointment of a woman to lead the dialogue process between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia?** 81.9% of the total sample responded either with 'very much' or 'somewhat' to appoint a woman to lead the dialogue process. In contrast, only 9.3% responded either with 'very little' or 'not at all' about appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process. 8.8% responded with 'don't know/don't have a view' on this issue.





An evaluation of the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a somewhat different but similar trend of responses. 84% of Albanians and 54% among Serbs responded either with 'very much' or 'somewhat' in support of appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process. 7% among Albanians and 32% among Serbs responded either with 'very little' or 'not at all' about appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process. 8% among Albanians and 4% among Serbs do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue. These results indicate that Albanian respondents strongly support appointing a woman to lead the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. Differently, Serbian respondents in Kosovo seem more heterogeneous, albeit with the majority supporting a woman to lead the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia.



### 3.5. Potential factors inhibiting women's participation in the dialogue process

Uncovering potential obstacles to women's participation in the dialogue process is critical to understanding the reasons why women are not represented and included in the Kosovo dialogue team. RIDEA with Inclusive Peace, in a recent policy report with 43 structured interviews involving political, civil society, and international actors, identified a number of obstacles to women's participation in

the dialogue process in Kosovo.<sup>7</sup> Following the results from these interviews, the survey compiled a list of potential obstacles women may face in participating in the dialogue process (see the Table below for all the responses from the total sample). Specifically, the survey posed the question: **"To what extent do you think that the lack of women's participation in the Dialogue relates to..."** followed by a number of statements.

<b>To what extent do you think that the lack of women's participation in the Dialogue relates to:</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Don't know/don't really have a view</b>
Women lack the motivation to engage in the dialogue process.	4.9%	36.3%	38.9%	10.2%	9.7%
It is tough for women to be committed to Dialogue.	4.9%	22.7%	48.4%	16.9%	7.2%
The Dialogue involves tough negotiations that only men can do.	4.2%	11.3%	43.8%	35.6%	5.1%
Women are not represented in Dialogue because the main political actors are dominated by men.	12.5%	50.5%	19.9%	6.8%	10.4%
Women are not represented in Dialogue because the government lacks a strategy supporting women's engagement in Dialogue.	13.8%	46.8%	17.2%	7.7%	14.4%
The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes.	9.1%	29.2%	36.0%	16.1%	9.6%
International actors are to blame because they do not impose criteria for gender inclusion in the dialogue process.	7.4%	29.3%	23.7%	7.1%	32.4%

The results from the total sample show the following order based on participants' responses with either 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with the statement:

- Women are not represented in Dialogue because the main political actors are dominated by men (63%);
- Women are not represented in Dialogue because the government lacks a strategy supporting women's engagement in Dialogue (61%);
- Women lack motivation to engage in the dialogue process (41%);

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2.

- The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes (38%);
- International actors are to blame because they do not impose criteria for gender inclusion in the dialogue process (37%);
- It is tough for women to be committed to Dialogue (28%);
- The Dialogue involves tough negotiations that only men can do (16%).

As it can be seen, related to the obstacles to women's participation in the Dialogue, the majority of participants (63%) emphasize the dominance of politics by male actors; this is followed by the second choice (61%), who underlines the lack of a strategy by the government to support women's engagement in Dialogue. Regarding other obstacles to the participation of women in the dialogue process, support for other obstacles ranges from (41%) concerning the lack of motivation in women to engage in Dialogue to (16%) perceiving Dialogue as a tough negotiation only for men.

An evaluation of Albanian and Serbian samples on 'strongly agree' and 'agree' responses showed the following pattern of responses:

- Women are not represented in Dialogue because the main political actors are dominated by men (Albanian: 63% vs. Serbian: 63%);
- The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes (Albanian: 37% vs. Serbian: 56%);
- Women lack the motivation to engage in the dialogue process (Albanian: 42% vs. Serbian: 39%);
- The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes (Albanian: 37% vs. Serbian: 46%);
- International actors are to blame because they do not impose criteria for gender inclusion in the dialogue process (Albanian: 36% vs. Serbian: 45%);
- It is tough for women to be committed to Dialogue (Albanian: 27% vs. Serbian: 34%);
- The Dialogue involves tough negotiations that only men can do (Albanian: 13% vs. Serbian: 41%).

- Women are not represented in Dialogue because the government lacks a strategy supporting women's engagement in Dialogue (Albanian: 62% vs. Serbian: 51%).

#### **4. Analysis based on gender differences**

An analysis of participants' responses across many questions examined in Sections 3.1-3.4 of this survey indicates a large proportion of answers 'don't know/don't really have a view' for this issue. What is particularly puzzling is that both Albanian and Serbian samples indicated a similar pattern of responses related to this alternative. Consequently, to better understand the source of responses related to this alternative, analyses across gender differences were performed. Note that this survey sample represents an overrepresentation of women (58%) compared to the census figures for 2011 (50%).

The present analyses examined some of the main questions with a response rate of  $\leq 20\%$  on the alternative 'don't know/don't really have a view' for this issue. Specifically, 32% among female respondents compared to 16% of male respondents responded with 'don't know/don't really have a view' on the question 'How satisfied are you with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia?' Next, 52% among female respondents, compared to 28% of male respondents, responded with 'don't know/don't really have a view' on the question 'How satisfied are you with the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex between Kosovo and Serbia under the EU facilitation?' 28% among female respondents compared to 10% of male respondents responded with 'don't know/don't really have a view' on the question 'Currently, the dialogue meetings in Brussels between Kosovo and Serbia facilitated by the EU are represented only by governmental representatives from the highest level (i.e., prime minister and deputy prime minister). Do you agree that the Kosovo team should be represented only by representatives from the highest governmental level?' 21% of female respondents compared to 9% of male respondents responded with 'don't know/don't really have a view' on the question 'Do you think that the Kosovo government should make efforts to include

other representatives (e.g., representatives from opposition political parties, civil society, academia, etc.) in the dialogue meetings in Brussels?'

Chi-square tests in all these questions showed that gender differences were statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ). These results may suggest that (a) women, compared to men in Kosovo, are generally less preoccupied with issues dealt with in the survey; or (b) the views of women about issues dealt with in the survey are less crystalized; hence, the 'don't know/don't really have a view' option captures uncertainty in responses. While these interpretations should be taken cautiously, further research is needed to understand better gender differences related to the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia and women's participation in this Dialogue.

Additionally, we analyzed whether there are gender differences across statements related to the potential inhibitors of women's participation in the dialogue process (see the Table below). Chi-square results show that significant differences ( $p < .05$ ) across genders are on statements: (a) *The Dialogue involves tough negotiations that only men can do* (this perception is more prevalent among men than women); (b) *The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes* (this perception is more prevalent among women than men); (c) *International actors are to blame because they do not impose criteria for gender inclusion in the dialogue process* (this perception is more prevalent among women than men).

Do you agree that the lack of women's participation in the Dialogue relates to:	Strongly agree/agree		Strongly disagree/disagree		Don't know/don't really have a view	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Women lack the motivation to engage in the dialogue process.	38%	44%	52%	47%	10%	10%
It is tough for women to be committed to Dialogue.	30%	26%	64%	26%	7%	8%
The Dialogue involves tough negotiations that only men can do.	18%	14%	79%	80%	4%	6%
Women are not represented in Dialogue because the main political actors are dominated by men.	64%	62%	27%	27%	9%	11%
Women are not represented in Dialogue because the government lacks a strategy supporting women's engagement in Dialogue.	61%	61%	27%	23%	12%	16%
The society in Kosovo excludes women from all decision-making processes.	32%	43%	60%	46%	9%	10%
International actors are to blame because they do not impose criteria for gender inclusion in the dialogue process.	37%	37%	38%	25%	25%	38%

## 5. Conclusions

This survey had three main aims. First, the aim was to understand the perceptions and attitudes of the citizens regarding the current dialogue process and the most recent Brussels agreement between Kosovo and Serbia (February 2023) and its implementation annex reached in Ohrid (March 2023). Second, the aim was to understand the citizens' perceptions regarding the representation of Kosovo's dialogue team and the support or lack thereof for including other actors, specifically focusing on women actors/peacebuilders in the dialogue team. Third, the aim was to understand factors that inhibit women's participation in the dialogue process. A total of 1108 respondents in our survey (89% Albanians, 9% Serbs and 2% from other ethnic groups) make our sample nationally representative of the Kosovo population.

The survey shows that the majority of the Kosovo population *is not satisfied with the current dialogue process* between Kosovo and Serbia. Overall, **49%** of all the respondents are not satisfied with the current dialogue process. **46%** among Albanians and **80%** among Serbs were either 'strongly dissatisfied' or 'dissatisfied' with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. A substantial number of the Albanian sample also did not have a view on this question (26%). Albanians and Serbs showed a similar trend in responses about the reasons for not being satisfied with the dialogue process:

- There is no perspective of concrete steps toward European integration (60% of Albanian versus 68% of the Serbian sample);
- It is rather impossible to achieve global recognition of Kosovo under current circumstances (64% of Albanian versus 74% of the Serbian sample);
- The independence of Kosovo will not be recognized from Serbia under current circumstances (74% of Albanian versus 79% of the Serbian sample);
- There cannot be economic prosperity in the next 3-5 years (54% of Albanian versus 73% of the Serbian sample);
- It is not possible to have peaceful relations with Serbia in the current status quo (68% of Albanians versus 51% of the Serbian sample);
- Internal problems between the Serb and Albanian communities cannot be solved under the current circumstances (63% of Albanians versus 91% of the Serbian sample).

Despite being not satisfied with the current dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia, the opinion seems divided as to whether the *Dialogue should continue under the current format for the next five years*. Overall, **45%** of the total sample indicated a 'somewhat' or 'very much support' and **32%** 'not at all' or 'very little' support for continuing the Dialogue under the current format for the next five years. A significant number of Albanians sample did not have a view on this issue (24%).

Regarding *the agreements*, there is overall little support (**15%** responded with 'strongly agree' or 'agree') for the most recent Brussels agreement and its Ohrid implementation annex between Kosovo and Serbia. The majority of Albanian and Serbian respondents were dissatisfied with the most recent Brussels agreement (43% Albanians and 61% Serbs). Differently, the majority of Albanians *did not support* (**53%** who responded with 'strongly disagree' or 'disagree'), as compared to the majority of Serbs who *did support* (**43%** who responded with 'strongly agree' or 'agree') granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provided that Kosovo would eventually access some international organizations.

Concerning the representation of the Kosovo dialogue team, there is less support (overall, **34%**) for the representation of the dialogue team only by the highest governmental representatives and considerable support (overall, **66%**) for the inclusion of other actors in the dialogue team. The support is even more robust (overall, **82%**) for including women in the Dialogue and for appointing a woman (overall, **82%**) to lead the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia.

Regarding the obstacles to women's participation in the Dialogue, the majority of participants (**63%**) pointed to the dominance of politics by male actors and (**61%**) the lack of a strategy by the government to support women's engagement in Dialogue as the main obstacles for participation in the Dialogue. There was considerably less support for other obstacles, ranging from (**41%**) the lack of motivation in women to engage in Dialogue to (**16%**) perceiving the Dialogue as a tough negotiation only for men.



